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THE LEGAL THEORIES OF JAMES WILSON
"Without detracting, therefore, from the real merits
which abound in the imperial law, I hope I may have leave
to assert, that if an .Englishman 'must be ignorant of either
the one or the other, he had better be a stranger to the Ro-
man than to English institutions." Such was the spirit in
which Blackstone approached his task, not with the enthus-
iasm of a narrow nationalism, but with the inild suggestion
that that which is the fruit of English experience is of more
immediate significance in dealing with English proble~ns
than the experience of Rome or Byzantium. This is the
spirit in which this essay is made to call attention to the
legal theories of an American jurist who seems to epitotnize
the spirit of American legal institutions in the time when
they were first emerging as distinct from the institutions of
England.
James Wilson emigrated from his birthplace in Scot-
land to America in the days when John Dickinson :was one
of the leaders of the Philadelphia Bar. Wilson studied law
in Dickinson's office prior to the outbreak of the Revolution;
he was one of those pre-revolutionary pamphleteers who
tried to make clear the nature of the British Empire as a
commonwealth of nations, rather than as a centralized and
consolidated state. When those efforts were of no avail he
threw in his fortune with the patriot party. The outbreak
of the war found him a member of the second Continental
Congress. Hie has the remarkable record of being one of
those six men who signed both the Declaration of Independ-
ence and the Constitution of the United States, and he has
the unique distinction of being the only member of Pennsyl-
vania's rather large delegation to the Federal Convention,
who .was also elected a metnber of the Pennsylvania State
Convention which ratified the Federal Constitution. The
part he played in those meetings is evidenced by the histori-
cal and legal comments which have been made upon him
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"that he was the most learned lawyer of his time," "one of
the deepest thinkers and most exact reasoners among the
members of the convention," "the real founder of *hat is
distinctive in our American jurisprudence," "recognized as
the most learned member of the constitutional convention,"
"ablest and most learned of the associates" on the Supreme
Court of which he was a member.,
James Wilson's notable services in the period after the
revolution have secured his place in the political history of
the United States,2 but it seems extremely questionable
whether what we may call the science of jurisprudence has
accorded to him the place to which he is probably entitled.
That question becomes even stronger when one hears sone
of the professors of international law proclaiming from their
chairs either that there is no such thing as international law,-
or else hears those gentlemen define law in such terms as to
give international law no place. For such writers and lec-
turers one feels a little disposed to paraphrase Blackstone,.
and, as he advised Englishmen not to sacrifice Alfred and
Edward to Theodosius and Justinian, so to suggest that per-
haps they might find it of practical value not to sacrifice
James Wilson to John Austin and his school. The difference
between the sense and definition of law upon which the era
of the American Revolution depended for its politico-juri-
dical thought and that which has produced a great deal of
modern ante- and post-bellum chaotic thinking, can, it would
seem, be nowhere better illustrated than by an examination
of the legal theories of .Wilson.
One can do little better than to follow his own advice,.
to consider that "law should be studied and taught as a
historical science, ' and to regard his legal theories as part
of the history of that science. In the opening lecture before
the students of the Law School of the University of Pennsyl-
' The comments of McMaster, Bryce, S. E. Baldwin, J. M. Harlan and
Cooley; for appreciation see L. H. Alexander in The North American Review,
CLXXXIII: 971 (i9o6).
2 A. C. McLaughlin: Political Science Quarterly: XII, i.
3James Wilson's Works (Bird Wilson ed.) (Phila.: 1804). Citations
throughout are to this, the first edition of Wilson's works. I, 5.
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-vania, where Wilson was the first professor of law in 1790,
the lecturer remarked "Were I called upon for my reasons
why I deem so highly of the American character, I would
assign them in a very few words-that character has been
,eminently distinguished by the love of liberty and the love
of law." 4 Quite different was Blackstone's opening in his
first lectures as Vinerian professor at Oxfordwherein he speci-
fies the laws and constitution of Engiand as being a "species
-of knowledge, in which the gentlemen of England have been
more retnarkably deficient than those of all Europe besides.5
'Was Blackstone merely the more modest and Wilson merely
the more boastful of the two, or were they talking about two
,different things when they used the terin "law?" But let
that story tell itself. If it be tiue that the "men of the
revolution saw only two alternatives: freedom or slavery"G
it is equally true that the men of the Revolution understood
with a clearness which history cannot too frequently empha-
size, that freedom without the limitations of law was worse
than slavery. "Without liberty, law loses its nature and
its name and becomes oppression. Without law, liberty
.also loses its nature and its name and becomes licentious-
ness." This, after all, was a permanently valuable political
philosophy of Ihe American Revolution. Carefully docu-
4nented historical explanations of the American Revolution
in terms of taxation, the Acts of Navigation or the com-
-petition for commerce cannot but eclipse the element of
sound political thinking in which the founders of the republic
-delighted. 'Yet if we seek a picture of the early republic,
we find that political thinking in the abstract occupied a
much larger place than it does in the political science of
the twentieth century. It is a fact which cannot be ne-
glected, however much it may be minimized.
The men who were the product of the intellectual ances-
try of which James Wilson was but one of many, understood
the interrelationship of law and liberty and they conceived
4 Wilson's Works, I, 5.
5BI. Com. Intro. 4.
6 C. E. Merriam: American Political Theories, 53.
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of liberty as freedom according to law. They threw off the
yoke of England, not as law-breakers but as preservers of
the law. It is well known that independence was far from
the minds of the bulk of the citizens of the American colonies
when the first Continental Congress met. 7 What they
wanted was liberty under the limitations prescribed by the
British Constitution. They were being persecuted by the
real law breakers, for such was the parliament which had
violated that Constitution. "Have not British subjects,
then, a right to resist such force, force acting without author-
ity, force employed contrary to law, force employed to des-
troy the very existence of law and of liberty? They have,
sir, and this right is secured to them both by the letter and
the spirit of the British Constitution, by which the meas-
ures and the conditions of their obedience are appointed.
The British liberties, sir, and the means and right of defend-
ing them, are not the grants of princes; and of what our
princes never granted they surely can never deprive us."'
It seems to be the peculiarity of an Anglo-American Revolu-
tion that it is conducted, not so much for completely over-
turning the old order and *aking a new lot of laws, but
rather for the sake of getting the benefit of those rights
which the old laws assured them anyway, but which the
particular government is withholding. That is a fact which
should never be obscured in trying to get at the conception
of law in the period of the American Revolution. Law was
not merely some convenient rule, which might be adopted
one day and rejected the next at the whim of some assemblie
nationale or soviet. Law was something a good deal more
fundamental than that.
To James Wilson there were two totally distinct bodies
of law: natural laws and human laws. The political think-
7 "As our proceedings during the existence and operation of the Stamp
Act prove fully and incontestably the painful sensations that tortured our breasts
from the prospect of disunion with Britain; the peals of joy which burst forth
universally upon the repeal of that odious statute loudly proclaim the heart-
felt delight produced in us by a reconciliation with her." Wilson's speech in
the Convention of the Province of Pennsylvania, January, 1775. III: 251.
8 Ibid: III, 262-3.
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ers of the eighteenth century frequently confused them
elaborately. Wilson separated them, clearly, distinctly and
serviceably. The natural law was the immutable, univer-
sal moral law, the will of God. It would indeed be valuable
to know imore about it. But it is hardly a subject to be
treated in this effort and in this day when men are less confi-
dent than they were formerly of their ability easily to pene-
trate into the counsels of the Almighty. -Hence we turn to
the more modest task of trying to explain what James ,Wil-
son called human laws, and in that field there is much to be
done. This was what Wilson saw with such vividness when
he set himself to attack the views of inany of the publicists
of his day on the nature of law. Those views presented
just the same confusion of ideas and lack of clear thought
that is manifested today in connection vith that department
of law which is known as international law. The stumbling
block lay in the question of the definition of law, for upon
that depended the question of obligation. Is it law, if it is
not observed? Such a question springs from a conception
of law quite familiar in the writings of publicists froxn Puff-
endorf to Blackstone and from Blackstone to Austin. The
view that law is a command given by a superior to an in-
ferior which the inferior must obey upon the pain of some
sanction, is an easy and a simple thing to understand. But,
as has been observed, it leaves no room for such branches of
law as international law. After all, the contributions which
America has Inade to international law, both of letter and of
spirit, are of such a character which cannot but turn our
inquiries toward some more representative American con-
ception of law than that given by Blackstone or Austin.
Such a conception foiamed a part of that political philosophy
of the American Revolution in which so many of our national
ideals took form, and there are few jurists in whose writings
it comes out so clearly as in those of Justice Wilson.
"Law is a rule of action" had said Blackstone, "and it
is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior
and which the inferior is bound to obey." 9 At this point
9 BI. Com. Intro., 38.
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the new professor of law in the new American University
took issue with the Vinerian professor. "A superior! Can
there be no law without a superior? Is it essential to law
that inferiority should be involved in the obligation to obey
it?"'' 0 Here Blackstone has exhibited just that confusion of
natural and htlman laws which Wilson was at pains to differ-
entiate. Certainly, there were natural laws, which presumed
the existence of a superior, God, but to confuse these with
human laws was to presume that God had some temporal
deputy on earth to whom he had confided the power of enun-
ciating his law. This was in essence that divine right of
kings which the revolutionary thought of both England and
America had overthrown. Such a conception of law as
Blackstone prescribed was the essential element of "a prero-
gative impiously attempted to be established-of princes
arbitrary to rule; and of a corresponding obligation-a
servitude tyrannically attempted to be imposed--on the
people implicitly to obey."" It was the introduction of
superiority as a necessary part of the definition of law to
which Wilson objected. The idea itself is as old as Rome
and as tyrannous as Caesar. "Indeed on the principle of
superiority, Caligula's reasoning was concise and conclusive,
'If I am only a tman, my subjects are something less; if
they are men, then I am something more. "'12 Such would
be the logical and necessary conclusion of attributing to a
superior the authorship of human laws. Could such a con-
clusion ever be brought into line with the American political
principles as set forth in the American constitutional docu-
ments? It is difficult to see how they could. For these
were human laws, and once the element of superiority and
inferiority was introduced the element of the equality of
man was lost.
Such a proposition arouses at once the question, what
about the state? Did not, or would not he admit that the
state was superior to the individual? The question is a
10 Wilson's Works, I, 65.
"1 Wilson's Works, I, 66.
12 Wilson's Works, 1, 92.
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difficult one to answer, for Wilson's utterances do, not at
first glance seem to be altogether consistent in this matter.
But a little reflective reading seems to make the matter not
such a difficult one after all. In the first place the eighteenth
century thinker never lost sight of the fact that political
machinery existed for men, and not men for political machi-
ery. Hence, when he personified the state, it was as a figure
of speech, rather than as an act of awesdme deification. Its
dependence on the people which composed it was an essen-
tial element of the state. "In free states" says Wilson,
"'the people form an artificial person or body politic, the
highest and noblest that can be known." In that definition
the eighteenth century would have emphasized the words
"people" and "artificial" in a way in which one might not
emphasize them today unless his attention was especially
directed to it. The "moral person" which was thus consti-
tuted was described "as a complete body of free natural
persons, united together for their common benefit; as hav-
ing an understanding and a will; as deliberating, resolving
and acting; as possessed of interests which it ought to man-
age; as enjoying rights which it ought to maintain, as lying
under obligations which it ought to perform. To this moral
person, we assign by way of eminence, the dignified appella-
tion of 'state.' "1 In discussing the rights and duties of a
state he observed "that it is its right and generally its duty,
to form a constitution, and to institute civil government
and to establish laws." From this the hasty reader might
conclude that after all the state was the "superior" which
made the laws, and hence that after all, Blackstone was
quite right. But such a conclusion would miss the whole
spirit of the Revolutionary philosophy. There is nothing
quite like a debate to make a man show his whole hand, and
hence we may look for Wilson's own interpretation of his
idea of the state in that great debate with which the United
States began.
In the Federal convention of 1787 the idea of a "state"
was a thing very much more clear-cut than ordinarily comes
11 Wilson's Works, II, 12o-I.
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to mind when that word is used today in connection with
one of the component members of the federal union. There
were small-states men, and large-states men, and there were
states-rights men. But they were a great deal more "state-
conscious" than one would imagine who lives in the twen-
tieth century when the word "state," in connection with
the United States, has become a relatively less important
and less thought about entity. Yet, it was probably with
just some such idea of the nature of the state as Wilson
defines it above, that the states-rights men and the small-
states men urged the claims of their states. There was a
"state-sensitiveness" in that day which has been distinctly
on the wane since the War between the States. Conse-
quently, if we would get ourselves in the proper mental
attitude to understand the thought of a past era, we must
understand what they meant by words which in the day
have assumed a different connotation. When on that mem-
orable thirtieth of June, the federal convention seemed
deadlocked because the small-states men insisted upon equal
rather than proportional representation, the rights of the
"states" were urged in a language which betokens the ex-
istence in the minds of the states-rights men of an idea of
"state" which is a good deal more consistent with the techni-
cal sense in which that word is used today, i. e., as an indivi-
dual member of the family of nations. Delegates talked of
their right to join some foreign power, in case their wishes
were not granted. 1" Then it was that James Wilson uttered
those words which more clearly delineate his conception of
the relationship between the people, the law of the constitu-
tion and the state than we can glean from some didactic
utterance from a lecture platform. "If the minority with-
hold their consent to the new plan, if they will have their own
way and go out of the union, then let them go. Shall three-
fourths be ruled by one-fourth? Shall three-fourths give up
their right for the support of an artificial being called State-
interest? For whom do we make a constitution? Is it for
14 Farrand: Records of the Federal Convention, I, 5oi.
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men, or is it for imaginary beings called states, a mere meta-
physical distinction?"15 What Wilson was trying to help
build was a national state, and not a confederacy; hence
when those spoke who had the confederacy idea in mind,
his chief argument lay in showing his colleagues that the
state existed for the people and not the people for the state.
Consequently if the people wanted one national unit, they
were entitled to have it and not to blocked by acutely-state-
conscious delegates who seemed to regard the state as a
thing in itself, and consequently wanted a confederacy of
states. 6
Consequently, to have asked James Wilson whether or
not he regarded the state as superior to the individual, he
would probably have said that such a question betrayed an
unfamiliarity with the true nature of law. A State was
merely an aggregate of people, which expressed its will in
the law of the constitution, which in turn formed a govern-
ment. To endow a state with a metaphysical or a spiritual
nature,to grant it an existence above or apart from the
people was totally to misunderstand the thought of the
Revolutionary period in America. Nowhere does this
come out more clearly than in Wilson's discussion of sover-
eignty: the sovereignty of the state was not a term in which
he thought; the sovereignty of the people was all he under-
stood.,,
Now, if the element of superiority were permitted. to
remain in the definition of human law, mankind would be
compelled to answer the question as to whether this was a
superiority of force or of excellence, by which the superior
claimed his right to impose his will upon the inferior. The
former is exactly what Anglo-American revolutions were
fought to avoid, and it is easily disposed of. "For us, as
men, as citizens, as states," it is sufficient to say that power
is nothing more than the right of the strongest, and may be
15 Farrand: Records of the Federal Convention, I, 494.
16 See also Wilson's Works: I, 36o, where he uses "State" and "Society"
interchangeably.
17 Wilson's Works, I, 25.
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opposed by the same right, the same means and the same
principles which are employed to establish it. "Bare force,
far from producing any obligation to obey, produces an obli-
gation to resist. ' '18 On the other hand if the superiority be
based upon excellence, if the superior claim any superiority
by virtue of his being more wise, who will take upon himself
to make such a judgment. To speak of superiors, involves
the implication that there are inferiors; is government
consciously to take cognizance of the inequalities of men?
If so, what is the standard? "Is this a foundation sufficient
for supporting the solid and durable superstructure of law? "I,
Wilson's knowledge of comparative governments was
necessarily more limited than would be the case today, yet
it is remarkable how carefully he selects the illustrations
with which his points are elucidated. The classic references
abound, of course; he would not have been a true representa-
tive of the eighteenth century if they had not. But his
reading in the political scientists of all nations was exten-
sive; not merely among the English and French writers,
but among the continental writers of his day as well. Yet
he never forgets the essential distinction which makes his
work of such practical value, namely the separation of the
idea of the law which God makes and the idea of the law
which man makes; for, although in the case of the former
he would not deny the existence of a superior, yet in the
latter he would do so, and manifests therein the germ of
what is distinctively American in political science-govern-
ment by the consent of the governed. "Let it be remem-
bered all along, that I am examining the doctrine of superior-
ity as applied to human laws, the proper and immediate
object of investigation in these lectures. Of the law that is
divine, we shall have occasion at another time to speak, with
the reverence and gratitude that becomes us."20 In consider-
ation of this clear distinction since the alleged superior can-
not rest his title on any inherent qualities as goodness or
18 Wilson's Irorks, I, 71.
11 Wilson's Works, I, 74.
20 Wilson's Works, I, 7 1.
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force, from what source can such superiority be derived?
Divine source is ruled out by reason of the fact that it in-
volves not human, but divine laws; and, if the two be con-
fused, it being even more ruled out because it involves the
divine right of kings, what source remains? "How is this
superior constituted by human authority?'21
Is the superior constituted by law? If he is, then the
power which constituted that law is his superior, and we are
confronted by the same question as before.22 So the will of
a superior is discarded as an improper principle of obliga-
tion in human laws. It will stand the test of neither reason
nor experience; it contains the germ of tyranny, and it pro-
vokes the alleged inferiors to resistance and revolt. The
idea of law as a policeman's club is just the idea which Wil-
son would have his students avoid. However it might
represent the law and the idea of law in foreign lands, it was
not the Anglo-American idea as he understood it. Not
that he was an advocate of pure moral suasion; far from it.
He simply believed that that force which is the sanction of
law was not the exclusive property of the alleged superior
to do with it as he chose. The superior which existed for
convenience's sake in administration, exercised whatever
force he did only at the bidding of the alleged inferior, by
whose consent he exercised also his temporary superiority.
Thus it is, that when asked what in his view was the
essential element of law; which he would substitute for the
idea of a superior with a sanction, he states unequivocally
"In its place I introduce the consent of those whose obedi-
ence the law requires. This I conceive to be the true origin
of the obligation of human laws. "23 Customs were the first
laws known to men; certain conventional habits of actions
which mankind observed simply by ieason of the necessary
requirements of peaceful human intercourse. Customary
law was rudimentary law, and when the conventional types
of action crystallized into rules enforceable in the courts of
21 Wilson's Works, I, 83.
2 Wilson's Works, I, 85.
" Wilson's Works, 1, 99.
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law, the evolution of law might be said to have reached its
latest stage. Customary law was not the dictate of a super-
ior to an inferior. It was introduced by voluntary adoption,
and became general by the simple process of instances of
that voluntary adoption being multiplied.23 It became last-
ing by satisfactory experience, which ratified and confirmed
what voluntary experience had adopted and introduced.
"In the introduction, in the extension, in the continuance
of customary law, we find the operations of consent uni-
versally predominant." In the regulations of justice and
of government, customs have been more effectual than the
best of written laws. This view was in his estimation the
only view that could be held by an eighteenth century
lawyer. "Let us mention in one word, everything that can
enforce my sentiments: the common law of England is
customary law."24 One need go no further to understand
what Wilson conceived to be the essential nature, origin,
and source of the obligation of law. Here was not neces-
sarily any elaborate fiction of social contract or any dis-
cussion of the rights which mankind retained over and above
what the limitations of the law took away from him. The
simple distinction here made between common and statute
law was no ultimate distinction in origin or obligation. The
law which was produced by the enactment of legislative
assemblies derived its obligatory force only from that same
consent, given less formally, but none the less effectively
in the formation of the customary law. "Where is the
difference whether the people declare their will by their
suffrage or by their conduct."25 For "customs for a long
time were the only laws known among men" and "custom
is, of itself, intrinsic evidence of consent. "26 In the Anglo-
American legal system Wilson could not regard statutory
enactment as the only, or even the principal, species of law.
That English Common Law, "founded on long and general
custom," which in turn can be founded on nothing but free
24 Wilson's Works, I, IOO.
25 Wilson's Works, I, 64.
26 Wilson's Works, I, 99, I0O.
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and general consent, is the principal connotation which the
word "law" had for him.27 To him the eighteenth century
nomenclature was not his master, but his servant. Certainly
he would admit of "compact," "contract," covenant,"
"bargain" and whatnot; "let them be called covenants, or
bargains, or stipulations and anything similar to any of those,
still I am satisfied, for still everything mentioned, and every-
thing similar to everything mentioned, imports, consent.
Here history and law combine their evidence in support of
consent."28 This theory of the nature of law, Wilson re-
garded as quite different from those of Blackstone, whom he
thought followed rather after Hobbes and Puffendorf. His
own thought he traces back rather through Vattel and Locke.
This, after all was typical of the political philosophy of the
revolutionary period in America.29
If o ie would understand James Wilson's place in the
history of jurisprudence, it is not so much the comparison
with Blackstone which elucidates his theories as it is the
comparison with another English legal writer, of whom he
probably never heard, as John Austin was born in the year
in which Wilson began to lecture. James Wilson's legal
theories were the product of many years study of the writers
of many nations; but that studying was done in the intellec-
tual atmosphere of the American Revolution in Philadel-
phia, where Wilson lived for many years. John Austin
studied at the Inns, yet one cannot but feel that his juris-
prudence was colored by those years spent studying in Ger-
many in the intellectual atmosphere of the reaction after
the Napoleonic Wars. At any rate, his doctrines furnish
the antithesis which bring out the Wilson doctrine by con-
trast. To Austin, as to Blackstone, a law was a command
"which proceeds from superiors and obliges inferiors." Yet
he is more explicit and emphatic than Sir William. "The
term superiority signifies might; the power of affecting
others with evil or pain, of forcing them through fear of that
27 Wilson's Works, I, 206.
28 Wilson's Works, I, ioi.
29 Wilson's Works, I, 69, 82, 84.
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evil to fashion their conduct to one's wishes." "In short,
whoever can oblige another to comply with his wishes, is the
superior of that other, so far as his ability reaches; the party
who is obnoxious to the impending evil being, to that same
extent, the inferior. "30 Such was Austin's theory of positive
law. Of course international law has no place by definition,
for international law is customary law, par excellence. It is
the idea of law from above, the obligation to obey which
comes from the fear of a superior force, rather than the idea
of a set of rules which men have agreed to observe and which
derive their obligations from the consent of those men. As
to which is the higher sense of law, is a question of demon-
stration.31
But if Wilson's legal theories give us the proper legally
philosophical formula by which international law can be
elevated to a more respectful place in the science of juris-
prudence, that was quite an incidental consideration on his
part. When he comes to that subject itself there is another
contribution of another sort. The course of lectures, which
includes everything from legal philosophy to torts and
crimes, brings the 18th century law students, in the fourth ses-
sion, to the "Law of Nations." Once more there is the
clear cut distinction between those laws of nations which
take their origin in the law of nature, in divine law, and those
laws of nations which find their origin in consent. Of the
former, any thorough study of Wilson must take account,
but since we have assigned ourselves the less pretentious
30John Austin: Lectures on Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (1869) I: the first
lecture contains some interesting definitions, esp. 88-89. One of the clearest
criticisms of Austin in more recent thought can be found in Paul Vinogradoff's
book, "Common Sense in Law"-Chapter II.
1 We are, perhaps, now, as never before, in a position to take historical
cognizance of the effect of this distinction. The German has been accustomed
to regard the American as a rather lawless person, a conclusion only heightened
by the American's disregard for sign bearing the magic word "Verboten." The
American has learned to regard the German as an unfair player, one who dis-
regards the rules of the game, who hits below the belt. The one obeys com-
mands; the other observes rules. The one derives his sense of obligation through
a sense of fear; the other through a sense of fair-play. The one is the product
of discipline, the other of sportsmanship. Possibly, one may even go so far
as to say that the one is concerned with the letter spirit, and the other with
the law. At any rate it is easy to see which is the product of the Austinian
and which of the Wilsonian point of view.
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task of setting forth his views on human laws, we must hurry
on to that investigation. Wilson's contributions to what he
would call "the voluntary law of nations," or what we know
as "international law" as opposed to "international moral-
ity," are scant indeed. He criticizes Grotius freely for
applying so rigorously that rule of consent which he him-
self emphasized when dealing with law in the abstract. He
is frankly more interested in international morality and
expresses opinions which take the form of pious expressions
of hope, rather than statements of practice.32 Should any
of his students have dropped out at the close of this lecture,
they would indeed have gotten little from this professor's
exposition of the subject of international law. It is true
that Wilson did but touch the deeper questions of this field,
for to say "he who has made a promise to another has given
that other a perfect right to demand the performance of the
promise," is a statement which is hardly Machiavellian.
On the obligations of treaties he is as explicit as any writer
before or since: "Nations and the representatives of nations
ought therefore to preserve inviolably their treaties and
engagements: by not preserving them, they subject them-
selves to all the consequences of violating the perfect right
of those to whom they were made. * * In public as in
private life, among sovereigns as among individuals, honesty
is the best policy, as well as the soundest morality. Among
merchants, credit is wealth; among states and princes, good
faith is both respectability and power."33 But the trouble
with such pronouncements, then as now, was that such
principles were rarely denied in theory, while flagrantly
violated in practice, a fact which makes Wilson's conception
of the nature of law the more important.
But fortunately he does not stop here. The ninth
lecture of the series bears the interesting title "Of Man as a
Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations." Herein
he conceives the nations of the world as dwelling together in
that natural society, that "state of nature," which the com-
32 Wilson's Works, I, 149 ft.
3 Wilson's Works, I, 176.
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pact theorist assured him had existed prior to government.
Yet even in this natural society, states existed under law.
For a state to make a figure in the great society of nations,
it is sufficient that it be independent, i. e., "that it govern
itself by its own authority. " 35 But to secure justice in
"the great society, equality is the basis and the rule. To
this equality, the inferiority of subjection and the superiority
of command are alike, repugnant. This equality of nations
is the great and general foundation of national rights. In
this matter no regard is had for names;" all were alike be-
fore the law of nations, whether empires, kingdoms, common-
wealths or free towns.36 The abstract admission of this
legal principle is of little value unless some machinery be
provided for its administration, and consequently one in-
quires, how this right is to be secured in a world where war
still exists, where "among nations, as well as among indivi-
duals differences and causes of differences will sometimes
unavoidably arise." Since above independent nations no
coercive authority exists to which recourse may be had for
a decision of the controversies, there are several successive
steps which should be taken. Controversies often happen
in which neither party is intentionally wrong, where mere
misapprehensions and mistakes are the cause of the friction.
In such cases nothing more is necessary for amicable accom-
modation than candid conference and mutual explanation.
Such is the simple method of bilateral diplomatic negotia-
tion.
But "if the parties themselves, notwithstanding their
peaceful and proper inclinations, cannot finally agree upon
terms, according to which the differences may be adjusted,
those terms in many instances be arranged and settled by
the kind and benevolent mediation of a common friend, "
who should remember that his office is to conciliate and not
34 Wilson's Works, I, 360.
35 Wilson's Works, I, 362. Cf. John Marshall's "No principle of general
law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations.
Russia and Geneva have equal rights." The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 122
(1825).
36 Wilson's Works, 1, 364.
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to judge. 37 But if neither friendly negoation nor the bene-
volent mediation of a third power will avail, there is yet
another method "by which mutual irritation and much
more dreadful extremities may be prevented between those
who have no common judge on earth to whom they can ap-
peal. This method is to refer the matter in dispute to an
award of arbitrators. "3 If arbitration fail the next alter-
native is the summoning of an international congress "in
which the differences of contending parties might be deter-
mined by those altogether disinterested in them; and in
which, likewise some effectural means might be devised and
carried into execution for compelling nations at war to con-
clude peace upon fair and equitable conditions." But as
Wilson wrote this twenty-five years before even the very
deficient Congress of Vienna, he had little historical data
with which to elaborate this point. The congresses of the
eighteenth century called for such purposes "were nothing
more than pompous farces, acted with great parade, by those
who wished to appear solicitous for accommodation, but who
in fact were little solicitous to promote it."39 Beyond these
methods of international conciliation he knew of nothing
which legal practice would suggest other than reprisals
which would be in most cases merely the stepping stone to
war. So much for the law of nations as he knew it. It will
be observed that all these methods depend for solution on
the existence of rules of law to which the negotiators and
arbitrators may appeal, yet they are not rules or commands
given by a superior to an inferior, because in international
affairs there is no superior.
But Wilson was too good a political scientist to stop
there. "All the modes of adjustment which have hitherto
been mentioned presuppose the reconciliation of irritated
minds" is the way in which he introduced his own theory
of solving the problems of war. "But must the peaceful
adjustment of controversies between states, and adjust-
37 Wilson's Works, I, 365.
38 Wilson's Works, I, 365.
39 Wilson's Works, I, 367.
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ment so salutary and so necessary to the human race, depend*
on events so precarious or so very improbable? Must the.
alternatives in disputes and differences between dignified
assemblages of men, known by the name of nations, be the.
same which are the prerogative of savages in the rudest and
most deformed state of society-voluntary accommodatiorr
or open war, or violent reprisals, inferior in odium only to
war? Individuals unite in civil society and institute judges
with authority to decide, and with authority also to carry
their decisions into full and adequate execution that justice
may be done and war may be prevented. Are states too
wise or too proud to receive a lesson from individuals? Is
the idea of a common judge between nations less admissible
than that of a common judge between men? If admissible
in idea, would it not be desirable to try whether the idea
may not be reduced to practice? To return to the original
question-has or has not our national constitution given us
an opportunity of making this great and interesting trial?"40
In a word, Wilson was struck with the idea which has
occurred to many men since his day, that the United States
Supreme Court was in effect an international tribunal for
the settlement of dispute between states. As a matter of
fact, that is just the function that the Supreme Court has
frequently exercised, administering international law, and
being guided in its decisions by the principles of that law.4r
It was obvious to Wilson in the second year of the Supreme
Court's existence that being authorized to take jurisdiction;
in cases between states claiming to be sovereign, it would
form an interesting object of study for comparative juris--
prudence as an example of an international court. As a
product of the English Common Law system, Wilson could
not but be impressed with the latent possibilities of such a
court, proceeding along lines analogous to those of the Eng-
lish Common Law Courts, administering a customary inter-
national law, which was akin to the customary common law,
40 Wilson's Works, I, 377.
41SeeR. I. v. Mass. 4 How. 491 and Va. v. Tenn. 148 U. S. 503, 522-4
and authorities cited thereunder.
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and in certain sense even a part of it. Hitherto international
law "has been applied and administered by the force or at
the pleasure of the parties to the controversy: in the United
States it can now be applied and administered by impartial,
independent and efficient though peaceful authority," in
'such cases as come within its jurisdiction. To Wilson's
imagination this idea opened up a magnificent prospect of
the government of law, and of international peace based
,upon the existence of a court for the judicial settlement of
international disputes. His dream of world peace was not
*so much in terms of a super-state as it was in terms of a super-
court.
2
It is probably superfluous now to point out that the
,effectiveness of such a court would depend entirely upon the
sense of law possessed by those who submit their cases to it.
If the litigants in such a controversy felt that the law thus
.administered was merely the dictate of a superior, and if
the actions of the court were such as to justify that opinion,
-such a court would have little value. If on the other hand
the litigants possessed the spirit of fair play and a willing-
ness to abide by rules because of their personal interest in
the making of those rules, and if the courts were actuated by a
like motive, Wilson's dream was not a vain thing. But the
whole question depends upon the acceptance of his original
,and fundamental legal theories.
Randolph C. Adams
Philadelphia, April i, T92o
42 Witson's Works, I, 380.
